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Comments
PROPOSED PENNSYLVANIA JUVENILE ACT
I. INTRODUCTION
In response to Kent v. United States' and In re Gault, 2 almost
all state statutes regarding the rights of juveniles have been re-
examined. 3 The Pennsylvania Juvenile Court Act 4 has been no ex-
ception. As a result of a concurrent legislative resolution,5 there
has been introduced into the General Assembly a bill" completely
reorganizing the methods "[r] elating to the care, guidance, control,
trial, placement, and commitment of delinquent and deprived chil-
dren... ,,7 within the Commonwealth.8 The purpose of this Cor-
1. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
2. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
3. See, e.g., Billings, New Juvenile Delinquent Law, 31 TEX. B.J.
203 (1968); Fredy, Effect of the Gault Decision on the Iowa Juvenile Jus-
tice System, 17 DIIAns L. REV. 53 (1967); Gardner, Gault and California,
19 HASTINGS L.J. 527 (1968); Hawes, Gault and the District of Columbia, 17
AM. U. L. REv. 1953 (1968); McDonough, Juvenile Court and Judicial Re-
form in Arkansas, 22 ARK. L. REv. 17 (1968); McKay, Juvenile Law:
1969 A.D., 2 A.G., 32 TEx. B.J. 291 (1969); Reckless & Reckless, Initial
Impact of the Gault Decision in Ohio, 18 Juv. CT. JUDGES' J. 121 (1968);
Steinfeldt, Kerper, Friel, Impact of the Gault Decision in Texas, 20 Juv.
CT. JUDGES' J. 154 (1969); Stubbs, Juvenile Court Act of 1968, 5 GA. S.B.J. 219
(1968); Willey, Ohio's post-Gault Juvenile Court Law, 3 AKRON L. REV.
152 (1970); Symposium-Youth and the Law, 19 HAsTINGs L.J. 3 (1967);
Minnesota Juvenile Court Rules Symposium, 54 MINN. L. REv. 301 (1969);
Symposium-the Juvenile Offender and The Law, 45 N.D. L. REv. 179
(1969); Symposium-Children and The Law-Current Problems, 5 WiLLAM-
ETTL.J. 1 (1968).
4. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 243 (1933).
5. S. Con. Res. 132 (1967).
6. S.B. 1359, P.N. 1628 (1970).
7. Id., Title.
8. For an excerpt of testimony received and used in drafting this
ment is to examine significant sections 9 of that bill, to consider the
origins and the effect of new law promulgated therein, and to offer
such criticisms as seem valid.
The sections to be discussed were chosen because they seemed
to be the most important in terms of the entire juvenile court proc-
ess and because it is in these sections where the most change will
be seen. As the Proposed Pennsylvania Juvenile Act has ". . . gen-
erally followed the structure of the recently promulgated Uniform
Juvenile Court Act . . .,"10 this Comment will necessarily also con-
cern itself with the Uniform Act."
The foundation of the juvenile court system is the principle
"parens patriae." The New Jersey Supreme Court has succinctly
defined parens patriae as ". . . a right of sovereignty to protect such
persons with disabilities who have no rightful protector.' 1 2 This
benevolence is accompanied by some amount of despotism, as is evi-
denced by a declaration of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court as
early as 1838:
The right of parental control is a natural, but not an un-
alienable one .... That parents are ordinarily entrusted
with it [the education of their children] is because it can
seldom be put into better hands .... 13
The concept of parens patriae has been generally discussed by the
New York courts in two early litigations regarding the same child.
"The power of the state to intervene for the protection of the infant
was not the creature of statute, but is an inherent power in the
court derived from the common law."'1 4 "This conclusion [referring
to the above] . . . is warranted by the law of this state as well as by
the law of nature."'15 Thus, exceptional procedure for juveniles is
a well-established tradition in at least a few jurisdictions in this
country.
The efforts by reformers in the early twentieth century to ef-
fect an even more substantial difference between adult and ju-
venile courts is well documented and provides interesting read-
ing.16 These reformers created a system of juvenile courts which
bill, see Paulsen, The Changing World of Juvenile Law: New Horizons for
Juvenile Court Legislation, 40 PENNA. B.A.Q. 26 (1968).
9. Specifically, sections 2, 7, 19, 20, 21, 23, 26, and 28.
10. Foreword to PROPOSED JUVENILE ACT, Pennsylvania Joint State
Government Commission, at v (1970) [hereinafter referred to and cited as
the PROPOSED ACT]. The UNiFoRm JUVENILE COURT ACT [hereinafter re-
ferred to and cited as the UNIFORm ACT] was drafted by the National Con-
ference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and was approved by
the American Bar Association on August 7, 1968.
11. See generally Arthur, The Uniform Juvenile Court Act, 19 Juv. CT.
JuDGEs' J. 153 (1969); Burdick, The Uniform Juvenile Court Act, 40 PENNA.
B.A.Q. 47 (1968).
12. Johnson v. State, 118 N.J. 422, 426, 114 A.2d 1, 5 (1955).
13. Ex parte Crouse, 4 Whart. 9, 11 (Pa. 1838).
14. People v. Mercein, 8 Paige 55 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1839).
15. Mercein v. People, 25 Wend. 105, 35 Am. Dec. 653 (N.Y. 1840).
16. See, e.g., 0. KETCHUM & M. PAULSEN, CASES AND MATERIALs RE-
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remained largely unchanged until this past decade. The effects of
the system were of such magnitude as to prompt Dean Roscoe
Pound to say: "The juvenile court is the most significant advance
in the Anglo-Saxon administration of justice since the Magna Carta
in 1215."17 But Dean Pound went further: "The powers of the
Star Chamber were a trifle in comparison with those of our ju-
venile courts. . . ."8 These statements may seem inconsistent.
Dean Pound, however, can be credited with predicting by 30 years
the conflicts resolved by Kent 19 and Gault.20 The conflict is not
really between theory and practice, as may appear at first, but is
rather between good intentions and constitutional freedoms. Pa-
rens patriae supposedly was the justification for infringement of
these freedoms. Although this justification has been repeatedly
criticized the past five years by the courts and by other writers,2 1
it is not yet clear to what extent parens patriae has been repudiated.
II. SECTION BY SECTION ANALYSIS OF THE
PROPOSED PENNSYLVANIA JUVENILE ACT
A. Section 7-Criminal Proceedings; Transfer22
When a person under twenty-one years of age comes before an
adult criminal court and it appears that the alleged crime was com-
mitted after the person had reached his eighteenth birthday, the
criminal court must determine whether ". . . to continue the crimi-
nal prosecution would be manifestly unjust .... -23 In other
LATING TO JUVENILE COURTS (1967); H. Lou, JUVENILE COURTS IN THE UNITED
STATES (1927); J. POLin, A VIEW FROM THE BENCH: THE JUVENILE COURT
(1964); JUSTICE FOR n= CHILD; THE JUVENILE COURT IN TRANSITION (M.
Rosenheim ed. 1962); L. STRAuss, THE SMALL CHILD AND THE LAW IN PENN-
SYLVANIA (1943); F. SUSSMAN & F. BAUM, LAW OF JUVENILE DELINQUENCY (3d
ed.1968).
17. Foreword to P. YOUNG, SOCIAL TREATMENT IN PROBATION AND DE-
LINQUENCY at vii (1937).
18. Id. This quote also appears in the majority opinion in In re Gault,
387 U.S. 1 at 18 (1967).
19. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
20. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
21. See authorities cited note 3 supra. See also TASK FORCE REPORT:
JUVENILE DELINQUENCY (1967). The report of the PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION
ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF
CRME IN A FREE SOCIETY, 38-55 (1967), contains an abridgement of this
report.
22. Section 7 of the PROPOSED ACT reads, inter alia:
If it appears to the court in a criminal proceeding other than
murder, that the defendant is a child, this act shall immediately
become applicable, and the judge shall forthwith halt further
criminal proceedings and, where appropriate, transfer the case to
the Family Court Division or to a judge of the court assigned to
conduct juvenile hearings....
23. PROPOSED ACT, comment to § 7.
words, the adult criminal court must decide whether the person is
a child, as defined in section 2(1) (iii) of the Proposed Act. 24 Sec-
tion 2 (1) (iii) will grant to Pennsylvania juvenile courts a power to
hear cases not previously within their jurisdiction. 21 This power
".. . is designed to supply discretionary jurisdiction. . . where such
authority is necessary to prevent substantial injustice. '26  Thus,
the Pennsylvania General Assembly has admirably, and prob-
ably wisely, 27 extended to certain persons between the ages of 18
and 21 the privilege of having their case heard in a juvenile court.
It is submitted, however, that the Proposed Act fails to specify
which persons are to be granted such a privilege. It is further sub-
mitted that this failure may lead to a violation of the due process
requirements as interpreted in Kent v. United States.
28
Kent has held that in order to try in a criminal court any person
who might qualify as a juvenile, the waiver into such criminal
court must be in a manner conforming to due process of law.
29
These Kent requirements are codified in section 28 of the Pro-
posed Act.3 0 Nowhere in this Act, however, is it mandated, or even
suggested, that these procedures should be followed by the adult
criminal court when exercising its discretionary authority as in
section 2(1) (iii) of the Proposed Act. It is submitted that an adult
criminal court, when dealing with a person who might potentially
qualify as a juvenile, should be bound by the due process require-
ments of Kent as codified in section 28 of the Proposed Act.
Dean Paulsen, in analyzing Kent,3 1 has argued that there is
every reason to believe that the Kent requirements have signifi-
cance for adult courts as well as for juvenile courts.3 2 He submits
24. PROPOSED ACT, § 2(1) reads, inter alia:
'Child' means an individual who is: .. . (iii) under 21 years of
age who committed an act of delinquency after becoming 18 years
of age and becomes subject to this act by order of the court having
jurisdiction over him.
25. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 243(2) (1933), which reads, inter alia:
"The word 'child', as used in this act, means a minor under the age of
eighteen years."
26. PROPosED ACT, comment to § 2.
27. The Federal Youth Corrections Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 5005 et seq.
(1950), has given juvenile courts in that jurisdiction the power to hear cases
of persons under the age of 22. The Prisons and Prisoners Act, 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 4001 et seq. (1934), has extended this power to include, in certain cir-
cumstances, persons under the age of 26 (18 U.S.C.A. § 4209 (1958)).
28. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
29. We agree .. . that the statute contemplates that the Juvenile
Court should have considerable latitude. But this latitude is not
complete. At the outset it contemplates procedural regularity
sufficient in the particular circumstances to satisfy the basic re-
quirements of due process and fairness. ...
Id. at 552-53.
30. See discussion of section 28 at notes 47-91 and accompanying
text infra.
31. Paulsen, Kent v. United States: The Constitutional Context of
Juvenile Cases, 1966 SUP. CT. REv. 167 (1966).
32. Id. at 182.
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that this is especially so as regards the requirement of a statement
of the reason(s) for a court's decision which has "... a result of
tremendous consequences .... 33
No decisions can be found which address themselves to this pre-
cise issue. However, there has been much litigation regarding the
general issue of withholding juvenile court rights, or priirileges,
from certain persons. A number of state courts have held that
failure to observe the essential procedural requirements for trans-
fer results in want of jurisdiction of the criminal court to try the
case.34 There is, of course, authority to the contrary,35 but these
decisions must necessarily be reconsidered in light of Kent.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia stated:
"Treatment as a juvenile is not a statutory bounty which can be
withdrawn lightly."3 6 That same court had earlier declared: "It
is implicit in the [Juvenile Court] scheme that non-criminal treat-
ment is to be the rule-and the adult criminal treatment, the ex-
ception which must be governed by the particular factors of indi-
vidual cases. '3 7 New York courts, however, take a somewhat dif-
ferent position: "Youthful offender treatment is given as a matter
of discretion by the court, and is a matter of privilege. It is not
given as a matter of right." 38 The Pennsylvania cases generally fol-
low the New York position.39 It should be noted, however, that
these Pennsylvania and New York cases were decided before Kent.
The drafters of the Uniform Act stated that ". . . whether or
not to transfer is one of the most important decisions the juvenile
court makes .... -40 It can reasonably be inferred from this state-
33. Id. at 183. It is there contended that the Kent requirements
might logically be extended to grand jury inquiries and parole board
hearings. Id.
34. See, e.g., State v. Elbert, 115 Conn. 589, 162 A. 769 (1932); Childers
v. Commonwealth, 239 S.W.2d 255 (Ky. 1951); Wade v. Warden, 145 Me. 120,
73 A.2d 128 (1950); State v. Dehler, 257 Minn. 549, 102 N.W.2d 696 (1960);
Wilson v. State, 65 Okla. Crim. 10, 82 P.2d 308 (1938); Ex parte Albiniano,
62 R.I. 429, 6 A.2d 554 (1939); cf. Annot., 48 A.L.R.2d 663 (1956).
35. See, e.g., Jackson v. Balkcomb, 210 Ga. 412, 80 S.E.2d 319 (1954);
People v. Lattimore, 362 Ill. 206, 199 N.E. 275 (1935); State v. Monahan, 15
N.J. 34, 104 A.2d 21 (1954); State v. Doyal, 59 N.M. 454, 286 P.2d 306 (1955);
cf. Annot., 48 A.L.R.2d 663 (1956).
36. Black v. United States, 355 F.2d 104, 105 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
37. Harling v. United States, 295 F.2d 161, 164 (D.C. Cir. 1961); accord,
Haziel v. United States, 404 F.2d 1275 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
38. People v. Marino, 51 Misc. 2d 238, 240, 273 N.Y.S.2d 5, 6 (Dist. Ct.
1966).
39. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Diggs v. Banmiller, 191 Pa. Super.
101, 155 A.2d 402 (1959); In re Trignani, 150 Pa. Super. 491, 28 A.2d 702
(1942).
40. UNIFORm ACT, comment to § 34.
ment that the drafters recognized that great differences, especially
as regards disposition of the offender, 41 remain between the adult
criminal court and the juvenile court. As previously stated, the
United States Supreme Court has also recognized such a differ-
ence, holding that any waiver of the juvenile court privilege must
be in a manner conforming to due process of law. 42 It is submitted
that to allow an adult criminal court to determine in the manner
specified in the Proposed Act which persons should be granted the
juvenile court privileges is violative of these due process require-
ments.43  It is therefore recommended that section 7 of the Pro-
posed Act be amended by the legislature to require an adult crimi-
nal court to remand any case to the juvenile court when it appears
the defendant was under 21 years of age at the time of the alleged
act.44 The juvenile court could then retransfer the case, if such ac-
tion is indicated, thereby following the due process requirements
of Kent as specified in section 28 of the Proposed Act.45 An excep-
tion arises when the person is charged with murder, an offense
which the juvenile court has no authority to hear.
46
B. Section 28-Transfer
Because the transfer question is so important, it should be
useful to list the findings a juvenile court must make under section
28 of the Proposed Act in order to transfer a case to an adult crimi-
nal court:
47
1. The petition alleging the delinquent act must show that the
acts constitute a prima facie crime under the laws of the
Commonwealth;
2. The child must be fourteen years of age or older at the time
of the alleged act;
48
3. A hearing must be held;
49
4. Notice containing all particulars of this hearing must be
given to the child and to his parents; 0
41. See notes 142-163 and accompanying text infra.
42. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
43. An argument that this procedure might deny equal protection of
the law, as required by the fourteenth amendment to the United States
Constitution, might also be raised here. See UNIFoRm ACT, comment to
§ 34.
44. This change could be accomplished by judicial statutory interpre-
tation were it not for subsection (e) of section 28 of the PROPOSED ACT.
See notes 89-91 and accompanying text infra.
45. A problem arises when subsection (e) of section 28 is considered.
See note 44 supra and notes 89-91 and accompanying text infra.
46. See notes 52-54 and accompanying text infra.
47. See generally PROPOSED ACT, comment to § 28; and UNIFORM ACT,
comment to § 34, for additional guidelines for proceedings under this
section.
48. See generally PROPOSED ACT, comment to § 2(1).
49. This hearing must be in accordance with section 19 of the PRO-
POSED ACT. See discussion of section 19 at notes 92-128 and accompanying
text infra. Cf. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
50. See note 49 supra.
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5. The court must find that there are reasonable grounds to
conclude that the child is not amenable to treatment or re-
habilitation;
6. The court must find reasonable groups to believe that the
child is not committable to an institution for the mentally
ill or the mentally retarded;
7. The court must find reasonable grounds to believe that le-
gal restraint of the child is in the best interests of the com-
munity, or the court must take notice of the fact that the
prima facie crime alleged in the petition is punishable by a
jail sentence of more than three years.
It is necessary to emphasize that according to the Act all these
findings must be made.51 The only permissible alternative find-
ings are contained in Number 7 above.5 2 The only circumstance
under which these findings can be waived is when the petition al-
leges a prima facie case of murder.53 Transfer at this time is man-
datory and is final.
5 4
Obviously the best guidelines for use in determining transfer
are contained in the Proposed Act itself. However, a problem may
arise when defining what are "reasonable grounds" as specified in
in subsection (4) of section 28 of the Proposed Act. These require-
ments are paraphrased in Numbers 5, 6, and 7 above. The determi-
nation of what are reasonable grounds has been held to be discre-
tionary with the court.55 Any appeal 6 as to the finding of "reason-
able grounds" must thus show an abuse of that discretion. 57 Such
abuse has been defined as
. . . not merely an error of judgment, but if in reaching a
conclusion the law is overridden or misapplied, or the judg-
ment exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of
partiality, prejudice, or ill will, as shown by the evidence or
51. However, even if the Act were not so explicit, such exhaustive
findings would probably still be necessary. See Kent v. United States, 383
U.S. 541 (1966); Paulsen, Kent v. United States: The Constitutional Con-
text of Juvenile Cases, 1956 Sup. CT. REV. 167 (1966); UNIFORm ACT, com-
ment to § 34.
52. PROPOsED ACT, § 28(a) (4) (iii).
53. PRoposED ACT, § 28(f).
54. No such provision is found in the UNIoFm ACT. However such
practice is traditional in Pennsylvania. See In re Baskins, 430 Pa. 298,
244 A.2d 662 (1968); Mont Appeal, 175 Pa. Super. 150, 103 A.2d 460 (1954).
55. In re Weintraub, 166 Pa. Super. 491, 71 A.2d 823 (1950). Accord,
State v. Tuddles, 38 N.J. 565, 186 A.2d 284 (1962); State v. Van Buren, 29
N.J. 548, 150 A.2d 649 (1959); In re Whittington, 17 Ohio App. 2d 164, 245
N.E.2d 364 (1969). Cf. note 26 supra.
56. See notes 59-88 and accompanying text infra.
57. In re Weintraub, 166 Pa. Super. 491, 71 A.2d 823 (1950).
the record, discretion is abused.""
It would appear, therefore, that a juvenile would have a very diffi-
cult case if he wished to appeal a juvenile court's finding that there
were reasonable grounds for ordering the transfer of a case to an
adult criminal court as provided in subsection (4) of section 28, para-
phrased in Numbers 5, 6, and 7 above.
1. Section 28(g)
These guidelines, however, may actually have little effect. Ac-
cording to the Proposed Act ". . . It] he decision of the court to
transfer or not to transfer shall be interlocutory." 59  And it has
been said that ". . . the general policy of the law forbids appeals
from interlocutory determinations unless they are expressly pro-
vided for by statute."60  Since there is no such provision in this
statute, it would seem no right of appeal of the transfer order was
intended.
The recently enacted Appellate Court Jurisdiction Act,61 how-
ever, may make such an appeal possible. That Act provides, inter
alia,
when a court, ... in making an interlocutory order in a
matter in which its final order would be within the juris-
diction of an appellate court, shall be of the opinion that
such order involves a controlling question of law as to
whether there is substantial ground for difference of opin-
ion and that an immediate appeal from the order may ma-
terially advance the ultimate termination of the matter, it
shall so state in such order. The appellate court may there-
upon, in its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from
such order.
62
The question arises as to whether a transfer order by a juvenile
court ". . . involves a controlling question of law. . . ." It is sub-
mitted that since a transfer order may have a basis for a ". . . sub-
stantial ... difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal...
may materially advance the ultimate termination of the matter
," a juvenile court order for transfer could come within sec-
tion 501 (b) of the Appellate Court Jurisdiction Act.
63
Subsection (g) of section 28 has been proposed 64 as a codifica-
tion of the ruling of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Common-
58. In re Garrett's Estate, 335 Pa. 287, 292, 6 A.2d 858, 860 (1939).
59. PROPOSED ACT, § 28(g).
60. 9 STANDARD PENNSYLVANIA PRACTICE, Appeals ch. 38, § 50 at 46
(1962); accord, Caplan v. Keystone Weaving Mills, 431 Pa. 407, 246 A.2d 384
(1968); Sullivan v. Philadelphia, 378 Pa. 648, 107 A.2d 854 (1954).
61. Act of July 31, 1970, No. 223, [1970] Pa. Laws
62. Act of July 31, 1970, No. 223, § 501(b), [1970] Pa. Laws
63. See generally, for further explanation of the Appellate Court Juris-
diction Act, Amram & Schulman, The New Judicial Article and Its Imple-
mentation, 42 PENNA. B.A.Q. 9 (1970); Comisky, Commonwealth Court
Investiture, 42 PENNA. B.A.Q. 25 (1970).
64. PROPOsED ACT, comment to § 28.
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wealth v. Mcintyre. 5 An analysis6 6 of that case indicates the de-
cision was an interpretation of the Juvenile Court Act of 1933,07
which will be repealed by the Proposed Act.6 8 The court in McIn-
tyre was concerned with whether the order of transfer was a "...
final order of any judge of the juvenile court ... committing or
placing any ...child . .. ,"69 and therefore appealable as a mat-
ter of right.7 o By considering the lanaguage of the statute as a
whole, the court decided that the transfer order was not"... a final
order . . .committing or placing .. .,,71 and held that "... [t]he
hearing determination is merely a pretrial interlocutory order that
is not appealable. '72 The court dismissed a strong argument, con-
tained in several prior decisions,"7 that appeals from any order of a
juvenile court are a matter of right. In re Jenkins7 4 had held that
an appellate court should grant the petitioner ". . . great latitude
* . .so that the court might ultimately make a decision which serves
the best interests of both the child and society."75 The court in
Jenkins, however, was speaking about a final order of adjudication.
Commonwealth v. Pouls76 is more difficult to distinguish. That
decision recognized that juvenile courts have broad discretion to
transfer cases, but the decision went further to hold that an appel-
late court may set aside the transfer if discretion is shown to be
abused. 7 The holding of the Superior Court in Jenkins and Pouls
is no longer relevant in light of McIntyre. The reasoning of that
court, however, should be very helpful in deciding whether an ap-
peal of a juvenile court order of transfer should be permitted under
the Proposed Act.
Court decisions interpreting the statutes of other jurisdictions
should be considered in resolving this question. The New York
courts have generally held that a Family Court order of transfer
"... is appealable as of right, since it affects a substantial right and
is a final order terminating the proceedings in the Family Court."' 8
65. 435 Pa. 96, 254 A.2d 639 (1969).
66. See generally Note, 74 DIcK. L. REv. 782 (1970).
67. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 243 et seq. (1933).
68. PRoPosED ACT, § 40.
69. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 269-414 (1933).
70. Id.
71. Commonwealth v. McIntyre, 435 Pa. 96, 99, 254 A.2d 639, 641 (1969).
72. Id.
73. In re Jenkins, 210 Pa. Super. 501, 234 A.2d 49 (1967); Common-
wealth v. Pouls, 198 Pa. Super. 595, 182 A.2d 261 (1962).
74. 210 Pa. Super. 501, 234 A.2d 49 (1967).
75. Id. at 505, 234 A.2d at 52.
76. 198 Pa. Super. 595, 182 A.2d 261 (1962).
77. Id. at 603, 182 A.2d at 264.
78. B. v. B., 32 App. Div. 2d 808, 811, 303 N.Y.S.2d 216, 218 (Farn. Ct.
This holding is based on the simple theory ". . . that the same rights
of appeal apply in the Family Court as in other courts. . . ."79 The
Oregon Supreme Court is in agreement with the line of reasoning
in the New York cases. In interpreting the Oregon Statute,80 that
court held that a juvenile court order transferring a person to the
adult criminal court is ". . . a final order as far as the juvenile court
is concerned, [and] is appealable." 81 The decision of the Supreme
Court of Kansas in Templeton v. State8 2 is in accordance with the
New York and Oregon cases.
The California cases interpreting that state's juvenile court
statute83 are similar to the Pennsylvania courts' reasoning. It has
been held in California that the right of appeal is not constitu-
tional but rather is statutory, and the only orders of a juvenile court
which are appealable are those enumerated by statute.8 4 And it has
been further held that the statute does not grant the right of appeal
to a juvenile whose case has been transferred to an adult criminal
court.85
Based on the variety of rules and decisions regarding the right
to appeal a juvenile court order of transfer, it is submitted that
such right is a matter of public policy to be decided by the legisla-
ture. It should not be decided by relying on a judicial decision 6
that was not concerned with policy but which was merely an inter-
pretation of an Act that is about to be repealed. The Uniform Act
offers two alternative methods of solving this dilemma, both of
which would allow a juvenile to appeal an order of transfer.8 7 It is
therefore recommended that the General Assembly delete section
28 (g) of the Proposed Act and insert a provision similar to section
59 of the Uniform Act.8 8
1969) (interpreting N.Y. FAMILY CT. ACT § 1012 (McKinney 1963), which
reads, inter alia: "An appeal may be taken as of right from any order of
disposition. .. ").
79. Wener v. Wener, 59 Misc. 2d 957, 965, 301 N.Y.S.2d 237, 244 (Sup.
Ct. 1969); accord, In re Maliades v. Maliades, 17 App. Div. 2d 994, 234
N.Y.S.2d 274 (Sup. Ct. 1962); Montalvo v. Montalvo, 55 Misc. 2d 699, 286
N.Y.S.2d 605 (Farn. Ct. 1968).
80. ORE. REv. STAT. § 419.561 (1959), which reads, inter alia: "Any
person whose rights or duties are adversely affected by a final order of the
juvenile court may appeal therefrom."
81. State v. Little, 241 Ore. 557, 559, 407 P.2d 627, 628 (1965).
82. 202 Kan. 89, 447 P.2d 158 (1968) (interpreting KAN. STAT. ANN. §
38-834(b) (Supp. 1969), which reads, inter alia: "An appeal shall be al-
lowed . .. by any child from any final order made by the juvenile
court. . . ").
83. CAL. WELr. & INST'NS CODE § 800 et seq. (West 1961).
84. In re Conley, 53 Cal. Rptr. 321, 244 Cal. App. 2d 755 (Dist. Ct. 1966).
85. Brekke v. People, 43 Cal. Rptr. 553, 233 Cal. App. 2d 196 (Dist.
Ct. 1965).
86. Commonwealth v. McIntyre, 435 Pa. 96, 254 A.2d 639 (1969). See
PROPOSED ACT, comment to § 28.
87. UNIFORm ACT, § 59 and comments thereto.
88. UNIFoRM ACT, § 59 reads, inter alia:




Section 28(e) of the Proposed Act reads: "No hearing shall be
conducted where this act becomes applicable because of a previous
determination by the court in a criminal proceeding." As was sub-
mitted earlier,89 a criminal court is unable to effectively, or even
constitutionally, determine whether this act should become appli-
cable. It was therefore recommended that a criminal court should
transfer to the juvenile court any case where it appears the defend-
ant was under 21 years of age at the time of the alleged act.9 0 Sub-
section (e) of section 28 of the Proposed Act, however, would act to
prevent the implementation of this procedure, since the juvenile
court's findings after receiving the transfer could not really be
acted upon. Thus, it is recommended that subsection (e) of section
28 be deleted from this Act.9 1
C. Section 19-Conduct of Hearings
This section, derived from section 24 of the Uniform Act, is es-
sentially a broad outline of the manner in which the adjudicative
hearing is to proceed. More specific issues, such as the rights of a
juvenile and the method of determining delinquency, are dealt with
in section 23 of the Proposed Act.9 2 The crucial question in section
19 concerns a juvenile's right to a public trial by jury. Neither the
Uniform Act 9 nor the Proposed Act94 grant the right to public trial
by jury.
1. Trial by jury
The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution pro-
vides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury. . . ." This
right has been consistently denied in the juvenile court on the the-
ment, or decree of the juvenile court . . . by filing written
notice of appeal....
(b) The appeal does not stay the order, judgment, or decree ap-
pealed from....
See also Bowman, Appeals From Juvenile Court, 11 CRIME & DELIN. 63
(1965), for an excellent discussion of the variety of appeal procedures in
the different states.
89. See notes 22-46 and accompanying text supra.
90. See notes 40-46 and accompanying text supra.
91. The origin of subsection (e) is unclear. There is no corresponding
provision in either the UNIFORm ACT or the Juvenile Court Act of 1933,
PA. STAT. A.N. tit. 11, § 243 et seq. (1933).
92. See notes 129-141 and accompanying text infra.
93. UNiFORm ACT, § 24 provides, inter alia: "(a) Hearings under this
Act shall be conducted by the court without a jury .... (d) . . . the gen-
eral public shall be excluded from hearings under this Act ......
94. See PROPOsED ACT, § 19, which is taken verbatim from the UNI-
FORM ACT, § 24, quoted in note 93 supra.
ory that the proceedings there are not criminal in nature.9 5 This
major argument will only be briefly discussed here, since the United
States Supreme Court will be hearing arguments this term on two
cases, In re Burrus96 and Fucini v. Illinois,91 that should raise this
issue.9 8 The previous Supreme Court decision regarding jury trial
for juveniles, DeBacker v. Brainard,99 has been frequently misun-
derstood. In a per curiam opinion, the Court dismissed that case
as inappropriate for a decision as to whether such right to trial by
jury is required in a juvenile court.100 This dismissal was based on
the fact that the right to trial by jury in all state courts'0 1 was not
to be retroactively applied. 10 2 Nowhere in the opinion are the mer-
its of the issue of a juvenile's right to trial by jury discussed.
Strong dissents were submitted by Mr. Justice Black'0 3 and Mr.
Justice Douglas, 10 4 both arguing that a juvenile is entitled to trial
by jury in all circumstances where an adult would be so entitled.
An even more recent Supreme Court decision, Baldwin v. New
York,10 5 has discussed the right to trial by jury in general. In that
case a divided Court held that a jury trial is a necessity for all seri-
ous crimes, but is not necessary for petty crimes. A crime is classi-
fied as serious ". . . when what is at stake is the deprivation of in-
dividual liberty for a period exceeding six months." 0 6 Mr. Justice
Black and Mr. Justice Douglas, concurring in the judgment, argue
that the Constitution requires jury trial ". . . [i]n all criminal
prosecutions . ,'107 and to hold that this means only serious
crimes ". . . amounts ... to little more than judicial mutilation of
our written Constitution."'0 8 But Mr. Justice Black adds what
may be regarded as an important caveat when juvenile courts are
discussed:
There may be instances in which certain conduct is pun-
ished by fines or other sanctions in circumstances that
would not make that conduct criminal .... [B] ut when
... the sanction bears all the indicia of a criminal punish-
95. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Fisher, 213 Pa. 48, 62 A. 198 (1905)
(the court stated: "The very purpose of the [Juvenile Court] Act is to
prevent a trial." Id. at 53, 62 A. at 200).
96. 275 N.C. 517, 169 S.E.2d 879 (1969), cert. granted, 397 U.S. 1036
(1970) (No. 1441, 1969 Term).
97. 44 IIl. 2d 305, 255 N.E.2d 380 (1970), cert. granted, 38 U.S.L.W. 3456
(No. 1390, 1969 Term).
98. Counsel in Fucini v. Illinois has been specifically asked to address
its argument to the issue: "Does nature of action guarantee to juvenile right
to jury trial in delinquency proceeding?" 38 U.S.L.W. 3456 (1970).
99. 90 S. Ct. 163 (1969).
100. Id.
101. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
102. DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631 (1968).
103. DeBacker v. Brainard, 90 S. Ct. 163, 166 (1969) (dissenting opin-
ion).
104. Id. at 167 (dissenting opinion).
105. 90 S. Ct. 1886 (1970).
106. Id. at 1890.




ment, a jury trial cannot be denied.0 9
Since the Supreme Court decision of In re Gault,110 three juris-
dictions have held that a juvenile has a right to trial by jury,1 1" '
and six jurisdictions have denied such a right. 1 2 The Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court, in Terry Appeal,"' has recently denied an-
other argument that a juvenile court must proceed with a trial by
by jury. The court there held
.. .that of all the due process requirements which could be
applied in the juvenile courts, the right to trial by jury is
the one which would most likely be disruptive of the
unique nature of the juvenile process.
114
The Pennsylvania reasoning would seem to be supported by the
National Crime Commission's finding that
[t]here is much to support the . . . judgment . . . that
trial by jury is not crucial to a system of juvenile justice.
... [T]he standard should be what elements of proce-
dural protection are essential for achieving justice for the
child without unduly hampering the juvenile court's dis-
tinctive values.1 5
The Supreme Court may have given a hint as to its possible holding
on this issue when it said in Kent:
We do not mean ... to indicate that the hearing to be held
must conform with all of the requirements of a criminal
trial . . . but we do hold that the hearing must measure
up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment.1 6
But Mr. Justice Douglas presents a very strong argument against
this position. In his dissent in DeBacker v. Brainard,1 ' he argues
that the right to trial by jury is fundamental and cannot be
abridged for any purpose, no matter how beneficial that purpose
may be: "The balance of the rehabilitative purpose . . .and the
due process requirement of a jury trial is a matter for a future con-
stitutional convention.""18
109. Id. at 1892 n.2.
110. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
111. Nieves v. United States, 280 F. Supp. 994 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Peyton
v. Nord, 78 N.M. 717, 437 P.2d 716 (1968); Saunders v. Lupiano, 30 App.
Div. 2d 803, 292 N.Y.S.2d 44 (Sup. Ct. 1968).
112. Dryden v. Commonwealth, 435 S.W.2d 457 (Ky. 1968); In re John-
son, 255 A.2d 419 (Md. 1969); In re Alger, 19 Ohio St. 2d 70, 249 N.E.2d
808 (1969); State v. Turner, 453 P.2d 910 (Ore. 1969); Commonwealth v.
Johnson, 211 Pa. Super. 62, 234 A.2d 9 (1967); Estes v. Hopps, 73 Wash. 2d
263, 438 P.2d 205 (1968).
113. 438 Pa. 339 (1970).
114. Id. at 350.
115. TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY, at 38 (1967). See
note 21 supra.
116. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 562 (1966). This statement is
reiterated in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30 (1967).
117. 90 S. Ct. 163 (1969).
118. Id. at 169 (dissenting opinion).
It is predicted that no matter how strong an argument Mr. Jus-
tice Douglas presents, it probably will not prevail when the Su-
preme Court finally decides the question of a juvenile's right to trial
by jury. Even if the Court concludes that the juvenile court pro-
cedures are essentially criminal in nature, it may follow the basic
reasoning of Baldwin v. New York"1 9 and decide that a juvenile
court proceeding is yet another exception to the requirement of
trial by jury. Such a holding seems contrary to the literal lan-
guage of the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution.
120
2. Public trial
In re Burrus12 1 should also raise the issue of a juvenile's right
to a public trial, as guaranteed by the sixth amendment. In Burrus,
the juvenile court judge excluded from the courtroom all persons
except the several juveniles whose cases were being heard, their
parents or guardians, and their respective counsel. Counsels' objec-
tion to this was overruled. On appeal, the North Carolina Su-
preme Court held that the state had ". . . determined by statutory
enactment that a public hearing is neither required nor in the best
interests of the youthful offender."' 22 No mention was made of
the sixth amendment, although In re Oliver 23 had held that the
right to a public trial was to be enforced in state courts by the four-
teenth amendment to the United States Constitution.
As indicated previously, the Proposed Act holds that a juvenile
has no right to a public trial in Pennsylvania. 1 24 The Uniform Act
discusses the wisdom of making juvenile proceedings public:
There has been some recent tendency to permit publicity to
juvenile court proceedings, on the theory that this will act
as a curb to juvenile delinquency. There is little evidence
to support this theory .... [T]he harm it causes may
be great in the case of the repentant offender.
125
But again Mr. Justice Douglas would submit that these contentions
are irrelevant. 26 He would argue that whenever a procedure of the
courts is violative of rights enumerated in the Constitution, it can-




It appears as if a traditional juvenile court practice, no public
119. 90 S. Ct. 1886 (1970). See discussion of this case at notes 105-109
and accompanying text supra.
120. U.S. CONST. amend. VI, provides, inter alia: "In all criminal prose-
cutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by
an impartial jury ... "
121. 275 N.C. 517, 169 S.E.2d 879 (1969), cert. granted, 397 U.S. 1036
(1970) (No. 1441, 1969 Term).
122. 275 N.C. at 529, 169 S.E.2d at 887.
123. 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
124. PRoPosE ACT, § 19(d), provides, inter alia: "... [T]he general
public shall be excluded from hearings under this Act ..
125. UNIFORm ACT, comment to § 24.
126. See DeBacker v. Brainard, 90 S. Ct. 163, 169 (1969) (dissenting
opinion).
127. See notes 117-118 and accompanying text supra.
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trial by jury, faces certain examination and possible elimination or
modification in the near future. The conflict between parens pa-
triae and constitutional freedoms must again be resolved. It is sub-
mitted that a public trial by jury at the adjudicative stage 128 of the
proceedings would not be as destructive as is sometimes argued.
The juvenile would, of course, have the privilege of waiving these
rights, if such a waiver would be desirable. And perhaps the most
beneficial result of such a reform would be a further impression
on the juvenile of the fairness and impartiality of the decision
reached.
D. Section 23-Hearings; Findings; Dismissal
An understanding of current developments in the juvenile
court system cannot be had without an understanding of the Su-
preme Court's decision in In re Gault.129 For instance, the basic
rights of a juvenile at any hearing under section 23 of the Proposed
Act have been determined by Gault and are codified in different
sections throughout the Proposed Act.130 With reference to Gault,
these provisions are largely self-explanatory and will not be dis-
cussed at length in this Comment. For further clarification, the
corresponding sections in the Uniform Act should be used as refer-
ence.l"'
Section 23 of the Proposed Act requires the delinquency hear-
ing to be in two distinct stages: adjudicative and dispositional. This
follows the recommendations of the drafters of the Uniform Act.132
128. For an analysis of differences between the adjudicative hearing
and the dispositional hearing, see notes 132-141 and accompanying text
infra. By the very nature of the dispositional hearing, a public trial by
jury should not be required there.
129. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). See generally Alper, Children's Court at Three
Score and Ten: Will It Survive Gault?, 34 ALBANY L. REV. 46 (1969); Cohen,
Standard of Proof in Juvenile Proceedings: Gault Beyond a Reasonable
Doubt, 68 MICH. L. REv. 567 (1970); Douglas, Juvenile Courts and Due
Process o1 Law, 19 Juv. CT. JuFx.s' J. 9 (1968); Gardner, Gault and Cal-
ifornia, 19 HASTINGS L.J. 527 (1968); Ketcham, Changing Philosophy of the
Juvenile Justice System, 20 Juv. CT. JuDxs' J. 59 (1969); Ketcham, Can
Gault's Guidelines Protect Public Interest, 4 TRIAL 15 (1968); Miller,
Dilemma of the post-Gault Juvenile Court, 3 FAMILY L.Q. 229 (1969);
Paulsen, Constitutional Domestication of the Juvenile Court, 1967 SuP. CT.
REV. 233 (1967); Reasons, Gault: Procedural Change and Substantive Ef-
fect, 16 CRiMvE & DELiN. 163 (1970); Symposium-Minnesota Juvenile Court
Rules, 54 MINN. L. REV. 301 (1969).
130. As to the right to have notice, see § 13; as to the right to speedy
release from detention, see § 15; as to the right of subpoena, see § 16;
as to the right to counsel, see § 20; as to other basic rights, see § 21.
131. As to the right to have notice, see § 22; as to the right to speedy
release from detention, see § 15; as to the right of subpoena, see § 18; as to
the right of counsel, see § 26; as to other basic rights, see § 27.
132. See UNIFORM ACT, § 29. See also Burdick, The Uniform Juvenile
Court Act, 40 PENNA. B.A.Q. 47 (1968).
In the adjudicative hearing, the juvenile court judge,133 after hear-
ing such evidence as may be introduced, makes a determination as
to whether the child committed the alleged acts or whether he is
deprived.'3 4  Commission of the delinquent act must be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt. 13 5 At present the court must base a
finding that the child is deprived only on clear and convincing evi-
dence. 138 If these findings are not made the case must be dismissed
and the child discharged. However, if the findings are made in ac-
cordance with the law, the court then proceeds to the second stage
of the hearings, the dispositional stage. Here the court must find
that the child is in need of treatment or rehabilitation before the
child can be declared delinquent.13 7 The Proposed Act is silent on
the quantum of proof necessary to support a finding at the disposi-
tional hearing. However, the Uniform Act provides: "This section
... adopts the 'clear and convincing evidence' rule ... in de-
termining the need for treatment or rehabilitation."'18  This view
has been reiterated by a drafter of the Uniform Act: ". . . [i]n
making the determination that the child is in need of treatment or
rehabilitation, the court may make its finding upon the evidence
which is clear and convincing.' 1 9 The Supreme Court decision in
In re Winship, 140 which requires a finding beyond a reasonable
doubt at the adjudicative hearing, probably does not apply at the
dispositional hearing. The Court in Winship stated that ". . . the
opportunity during the post-adjudicatory or dispositional hearing
for a wide-ranging review of the child's social history and for his
individualized treatment will remain unimpaired."'
4'
When the court has made findings at these hearings in ac-
cordance with the law, it then proceeds to the disposition of the
133. In the future a jury may be required to perform this function.
See notes 92-128 and accompanying text supra.
134. PROPOsED ACT, § 2, states, inter alia:
(4) "Deprived child" means a child who:
(i) is without proper parental care or control, subsist-
ence, education as required by law, or other care or control
necessary for his physical, mental, or emotional health, or
morals, and the deprivation is not due primarily to the lack
of financial means of his parents, guardian, or other custodian;
or (ii) has been placed for care or adoption in violation of
law; or (iii) has been abandoned by his parents, guardian, or
other custodian; or (iv) is without a parent, guardian, or legal
custodian; or (v) while subject to compulsory school attend
ance is habitually and without justification truant from school.
135. In re Winship, 90 S. Ct. 1068 (1970) has made this standard of proof
a constitutional requirement in juvenile court proceedings in the adjudica-
tive stage.
136. PROPOSED ACT, § 23(c); accord, UNIFORM ACT, § 29(c). Cf. In re
Urbasek, 38 Ill. 2d 535, 232 N.E.2d 716 (1967).
137. See PROPOSED ACT, § 2(3) and comments thereto, and UNIFORM
ACT, § 2(3) and comments thereto.
138. UNIFORM ACT, comment to § 29.
139. Burdick, The Uniform Juvenile Court Act, 40 PENNA. B.A.Q. 47,
49 (1968).
140. 90 S. Ct. 1068 (1970).
141. Id. at 1074.
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child as outlined in section 24 and section 25 of the Proposed Act.
These sections, when read with the comments, are self-explanatory.
The court is required to ". . .make . ..orders of disposition best
suited to [the child's] treatment, rehabilitation, and welfare.
S. .142 Rouse v. Cameron,'4 ' which one author has said repre-
sents "... the emerging doctrine of right to treatment ... ,1
relates to these two sections. In Rouse, the petitioner had been in-
voluntarily committed to an institution for the mentally ill after
having been found not guilty, by reason of insanity, of carrying a
dangerous weapon. His attorney subsequently asked for relief in
habeas corpus, claiming that petitioner was receiving no treatment
in the hospital and that by the manner of his commitment he was
entitled to such treatment. The court, relying on a District of Co-
lumbia statute, 4 5 held that such a right to treatment exists, with
the alternative of being released from custody. 46 This finding was
based on the premise that "[t]he purpose of involuntary hospital-
ization is treatment, not punishment . . ." and "[c] ommitment
on this basis is permissible because of its humane therapeutic
goals.' 48 A possible analogy can be made between these statements
and the rationale underlying the juvenile court system. The pre-
amble to the Pennsylvania Juvenile Court Act of 1933 states that
"... the real interests of. . .children require that they be not in-
carcerated in jails and penitentiaries ...but be subjected to wise
care, guidance and control .... -149 In other words, as was said in
Rouse, "[t]he purpose . . . is treatment, not punishment ... .
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has denied there is an anal-
ogy between Rouse and the Pennsylvania Juvenile Court Act. In
deciding In re Jones,'5 ' the court ruled that Rouse was an inter-
pretation of the District of Columbia statute and had no applica-
tion in Pennsylvania. However, Creek v. Stone, 52 decided by the
same court that decided Rouse, must be regarded as contrary to the
Pennsylvania holding in In re Jones.' 53 The basic argument in
Creek is concerned with the overall purpose of the District of Co-
142. PROposE ACT, § 25.
143. 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
144. Forer, Rights of Children: The Legal Vacuum, 55 A.B.A.J. 1151,
1154 (1969).
145. D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-501 et seq. (1967).
146. Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451, 459 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
147. Id. at 452.
148. Id. at 453.
149. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 243 (1933).
150. 373 F.2d at 452.
151. 432 Pa. 44, 246 A.2d 356 (1968).
152. 379 F.2d 106 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
153. 432 Pa. 44, 246 A.2d 356 (1968).
lumbia Juvenile Act,'5 4 and it is submitted that that purpose' 55
does not substantially differ from the purpose of the Pennsylvania
Juvenile Court Act. 15 6 After considering that purpose, and re-
lying on its prior holding in Rouse, the Creek court stated that
"habeas corpus is available not only to an applicant who claims he
is entitled to be freed of all restraints, but also to an applicant who
protests his confinement in a certain place, or under certain cir-
cumstances, that he claims vitiate the justification for confine-
ment."'"57 The court concluded that where a juvenile court has
found a child to be in need of a certain type of treatment, some such
treatment must be provided or the child may be given relief in ha-
beas corpus. 5 8 Thus, a juvenile delinquent's right to treatment
has become well established in one jurisdiction. 159  However, its
acceptance by other jurisdictions is an open question.
It is submitted that the definition of parens patriae' 60 and the
fact that a juvenile cannot be adjudged delinquent unless he is
found to be in need of some type of treatment or rehabilitation1 6'
indicate the validity of the Rouse argument in Pennsylvania. It is
incongruous to demand a finding of a need for treatment and
then incarcerate without providing that treatment. Eventually,
Pennsylvania must accept some modification of the District of Co-
lumbia doctrine as expressed in Rouse v. Cameron 6 2 and Creek v.
Stone.'
6 3
E. Section 26-Limitation on Length of Commitment
Section 26,164 when read in conjunction with the comment
thereto, 6 ' is ambiguous and perhaps even contradictory. The
154. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2301 et seq. (1967).
155. [W]e begin by emphasizing that the . . legislation rests, in
various aspects, on the premise that the state is acting as parens
patriae . . . and that it is because of this that the appropriate offi-
cials. . . are permitted to take and retain custody of the child ...
379 F.2d at 109.
156. The Preamble to the Pennsylvania Juvenile Court Act of 1933
(PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 243 et seq. (1933)) states, inter alia: "IT]he real
interests of . .. children require that they be not incarcerated in jails
and penitentiaries .. .but be subjected to wise care, guidance and con-
trol...."
157. Creek v. Stone, 379 F.2d 106, 109 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
158. This appeal, however, was ultimately dismissed as moot. Id. at
112.
159. Accord, In re Elmore, 382 F.2d 125 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
160. See notes 12-14 and accompanying text supra.
161. See notes 137-141 and accompanying text supra.
162. 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
163. 379 F.2d 106 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
164. PROPOSED ACT, § 26 reads, inter alia: "No child shall initially be
committed ... for a period .. . longer than he could have been com-
mitted if convicted of the same offense in a criminal prosecution. ...
The initial commitment may be extended .. "
165. PROPOSED ACT, comment to § 26, states that the purpose of section
26 is ". . . to ensure that a child not be committed for a period longer than
that for which he could have been committed if convicted of the same of-
fense in a criminal prosecution. ... "
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words of the Proposed Act are quite clear in saying that only the
initial length of commitment is limited to the amount of time an
adult could have been committed if convicted of the same offense.
This initial commitment can be extended beyond the imposed limi-
tation, so a child may, in the end, serve a longer period of commit-
ment than if he had been convicted of the same offense in an adult
criminal court. The purpose of the section, as declared in the com-
ment, 16  is not totally accomplished.
Wilson Appeal '6 7 held that this practice of longer incarceration
for juveniles is not unconstitutional as violating the 'equal protec-
tion' clause of the fourteenth amendment.168 Charles Wilson had
been declared a delinquent as a result of his participation in an
inter-racial street fight in Lancaster, Pennsylvania. His petition
was based on two counts of simple assault and battery, an offense
which carries a maximum sentence of two years for each count. 169
Wilson was sixteen years of age at the time of his adjudication and
the juvenile court judge sentenced him to incarceration until he at-
tained majority, or a period of five years. The Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court ruled that such a longer period of incarceration is
justified
if all three facts are present: (1) The juvenile must have
notice ... of any and all factors upon which the State pro-
poses to base adjudication; (2) the ultimate conclusions
upon which the finding. . . is based, and the facts support-
ing each of them, must be clearly found and set forth in the
adjudication; and (3) it must be clear that the longer com-
mitment will result in the juvenile's receiving appropriate
rehabilitative care and not just in his being deprived of his
liberty for a longer time .... 170
The Wilson decision refutes the equal protection argument by re-
liance on Commonwealth v. Daniel.71 The Daniel decision held
that a state may recognize and create classifications which will not
violate the equal protection clause, as long as these classifications
are reasonable and ". . . exist by virtue of the very nature of the
subjects or persons being classified. ' 172 Juveniles such as Charles
166. Id.
167. 438 Pa. 425 (1970).
168. U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, § 1, provides, inter alia: "No State shall
... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws."
169. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4708 (1939). This crime is classified as a
misdemeanor.
170. Wilson Appeal, 438 Pa. 425, 432 (1970).
171. 430 Pa. 642, 243 A.2d 400 (1968).
172. Id. at 648, 243 A.2d at 403.
Wilson are apparently within this type of classification.
Wilson Appeal173 was reversed and remanded for a new trial, as
the juvenile court had not granted the petitioner his rights as re-
quired by Gault.1 74  Mr. Justice Cohen, joined by Chief Justice
Bell, filed an opinion concurring with the result reached by the ma-
jority but dissenting on the issue of the length of commitment. Jus-
tice Cohen concluded by saying, ". . . I do not believe that a juve-
nile can ever be incarcerated for a longer period than an adult for
the same conduct.'
75
Courts in other jurisdictions have followed basically the same
reasoning as Pennsylvania in rejecting the argument that a longer
period of incarceration for a juvenile is violative of the fourteenth
amendment. It has been said that "[t]he differences in character,
condition, or situation of the offender justify the sentences pre-
scribed . . .even though in a given case the confinement may ex-
ceed the maximum for a similar crime of one beyond the maximum
age limit.... ,117 The practice has also been attacked as consti-
tuting cruel and unusual punishment as prohibited by the eighth
amendment. v7 7 This argument has also been uniformly rejected. 17
Thus it appears that by virtue of the Proposed Act, as author-
ized by judicial decisions, a person convicted in a juvenile court may
be incarcerated for a longer period of time than if he had been con-
victed of the same offense in an adult criminal court. The mere
statement of the rule seems to disclose its inequity.
III. CONCLUSION
The significant advances 179 in the juvenile court system in the
past five years have quite obviously rejected the theory that "Star
Chamber powers"'80 are necessary to implement and fulfill the
traditional theory of parens patriae. Tt is submitted that these ad-
vances have not in any manner repudiated the concept of parens
patriae; rather that concept and its correlative duties have been
significantly enlarged. In fact, these recent developments in ju-
173. 438 Pa. 425 (1970).
174. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
175. Wilson Appeal, 438 Pa. 425, 435 (1970).
176. United States v. Cocklin, 178 F. Supp. 318, 320 (D. Ky. 1959);
accord, United States v. Wallace, 269 F.2d 394 (3d Cir. 1959); Ex parte
Nichols, 110 Cal. 651, 43 P. 9 (1896).
177. U.S. CONST., amend. VIII, provides: "Excessive bail shall not be
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted."
178. See, e.g., United States v. Rehfeld, 416 F.2d 273 (9th Cir. 1969);
United States v. Dancis, 406 F.2d 729 (2d Cir. 1969).
179. See, e.g., In re Winship, 90 S. Ct. 1068 (1970); In re Gault, 387
U.S. 1 (1967); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966); Creek v. Stone,
379 F.2d 106 (D.C. Cir. 1967); UNIFORM JUVENILE COURT ACT; TASK FORCE
REPORT: JUV_.NIL. DELINQUENCY (1967).
180. R. POUND, Foreword to P. YOUNG, SOCIAL TREATMENT IN PROBATION




venile law"" indicate that, in the future, parens patriae could ac-
tually become a justification for the expansion of the rights of ju-
veniles, rather than an excuse for the repression of such rights.
In Hohfeldian terms,' 8 2 this expansion of a juvenile's rights
must necessarily expand the corresponding duties of the states.
Such has been the dominant and central theme of the advances al-
ready mentioned. 8 3 But, for the reasons stated in the conclusions
to each section of this Comment, it is submitted that the Proposed
Pennsylvania Juvenile Act does little to contribute to this expan-
sion of rights and duties. In fact, the Proposed Act may eventually
serve to hamper such expansion. It is therefore concluded that the
Proposed Act cannot be lauded as a ". . . significant advance in the
Anglo-Saxon administration of justice ... 11,114 until evidence is
presented that the General Assembly has in fact acknowledged and
accepted the duties of parens patriae. There is little evidence of
such acknowledgment and acceptance in this Proposed Act.
ROBERT W. BARTON
ADDENDUM
Subsequent to the completion of this comment a new Juvenile
Act (S.B. 439, P.N. 446, 1971) was introduced into the Pennsylvania
General Assembly. With the exception of section two, the new
Juvenile Act is identical to the sections of the Proposed Act
discussed in this comment. Section 2 (1) (iii) of the previous Pro-
posed Act has been deleted from the new Act, so that a juvenile
court will not have discretionary jurisdiction to hear cases of
individuals alleged to have committed a delinquent act when they
were between the ages of 18 and 21 (see notes 24-26 and accom-
panying text supra). Thus the discussion at II-A of this comment
(see notes 22-46 and accompanying text supra) is practically ir-
relevant as far as Pennsylvania juvenile courts are concerned.
However the matter there discussed is of more than academic
interest as regards the Uniform Act and any state juvenile court
acts patterned after the Uniform Act. As mentioned previously,
with this exception in section two, all sections of the Proposed Act
discussed in this comment have not been changed in the new
Juvenile Act.
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